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How do governments contribute to the pharmaceuticalization of society? Whilst the pivotal role of in-
dustry is extensively documented, this article shows that governments too are accelerating, intensifying
and opening up new trajectories of pharmaceuticalization in society. Governments are becoming more
deeply invested in pharmaceuticals because their national security strategies now aspire to defend
populations against health-based threats like bioterrorism and pandemics. To counter those threats,
governments are acquiring and stockpiling a panoply of ‘medical countermeasures’ such as antivirals,
next-generation vaccines, antibiotics and anti-toxins. More than that, governments are actively incen-
tivizing the development of many new medical countermeasures e principally by marshaling the state’s
unique powers to introduce exceptional measures in the name of protecting national security. At least
ﬁve extraordinary policy interventions have been introduced by governments with the aim of stimu-
lating the commercial development of novel medical countermeasures: (1) allocating earmarked public
funds, (2) granting comprehensive legal protections to pharmaceutical companies against injury
compensation claims, (3) introducing bespoke pathways for regulatory approval, (4) instantiating
extraordinary emergency use procedures allowing for the use of unapproved medicines, and (5)
designing innovative logistical distribution systems for mass drug administration outside of clinical
settings. Those combined efforts, the article argues, are spawning a new, government-led and quite
exceptional medical countermeasure regime operating beyond the conventional boundaries of phar-
maceutical development and regulation. In the ﬁrst comprehensive analysis of the pharmaceuticalization
dynamics at play in national security policy, this article unearths the detailed array of policy in-
terventions through which governments too are becoming more deeply imbricated in the pharmaceu-
ticalization of society.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
Recent scholarship identiﬁes multiple drivers for the pharma-
ceuticalization of society (Abraham, 2010; Gabe, 2014; Williams
et al., 2009, 2011). Scientiﬁc advances in biomedicine are one sig-
niﬁcant factor, because such discoveries enable novel pharmaceu-
tical products to be developed (Clarke et al.,, 2010). The broader
medicalization of existence too is a relevant driver, as it encourages
a social tendency to address complex issues through recourse to
pharmaceutical therapies (Conrad, 2007). More aggressive industry
promotion and direct-to-consumer advertising can similarly in-
crease the societal penetration of pharmaceutical products, which
is why several inﬂuential studies have emphasized the inﬂuence ofr Ltd. This is an open access articlepharmaceutical companies (Healy, 1997, 2004; Dumit, 2012;
Goldacre, 2012). Governments by contrast have so far only been
accorded a much more modest role in the scholarship, which tends
to focus on the expedited approaches some state regulatory
agencies are taking in the approval of new pharmaceuticals
(Abraham, 2010; Williams et al., 2011). This article, however, shows
that governments are much more active and complex drivers of
pharmaceuticalization than the received picture suggests. Gov-
ernments too are today accelerating, intensifying and opening up
new trajectories of pharmaceuticalization in society; and they are
doing so through a much broader array of policy instruments than
just their regulatory powers alone.
Key to this renewed political investment in pharmaceuticals is
the fact that governments now view the protection of their pop-
ulations against acute infectious disease threats as a core part of
their national security mission. The World Health Organization
(WHO) has warned governments that a new pandemic infectingunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
S. Elbe et al. / Social Science & Medicine 131 (2015) 263e271264roughly 25% of the world population (a ﬁgure derived from previ-
ous pandemics), would affect more than 1.5 billion people and
cause enormous social disruption due to a rapid surge in illnesses
and deaths (WHO, 2007: 47). Governments have also been spurned
into preparing for the deliberate release of a biological agent
through an act of bioterrorism e as exempliﬁed by the anthrax
letters mailed in the United States in the autumn of 2001.
Acknowledging those microbial vulnerabilities, governments in the
United States and Europe have expanded their security agendas to
formally incorporate health-based threats (WHO, 2007; EC, 2009).
Indeed, the rapid proliferation of the new notion of ‘health security’
in a plethora of international policy debates and ofﬁcial documents
testiﬁes to the growing signiﬁcance that governments now attach
to defending their societies against such infectious disease threats
(WHA, 2001; GHSI, 2002; WHO, 2007; European Council, 2008; EC,
2009; Elbe, 2009, 2010b). Security policy, as Melinda Cooper ob-
serves, needs ‘to arm itself against the generic microbiological
threat, from wherever it might emerge’ (Cooper, 2008:75).
One of the principal ways governments are trying to counter
those threats is by acquiring and stockpiling a panoply of ‘medical
countermeasures’ e like antivirals, next-generation vaccines, anti-
biotics and anti-toxins. So strong, in fact, is the political interest in
obtaining better pharmaceutical defences, that governments are
also trying to actively incentivize the commercial development of
many new medical countermeasures. This article identiﬁes, maps
and analyzes the complex array of new policy initiatives govern-
ments are introducing to stimulate the development of such novel
medical countermeasure. For its source material, the article draws
upon semi-structured, background interviews carried out with key
informants from government, industry and academia in the United
States and Europe, where medical countermeasure are a political
priority. Informants were selected on the basis on their detailed
knowledge of the government programmes and regulatory pro-
cedures surrounding medical countermeasures. Interviews
explored the key issues involved in the development, approval, and
deployment of medical countermeasures e especially of antivirals
and vaccines. Those ﬁndings were corroborated through extensive
analysis of a wide range of policy papers, background papers,
working papers and articles on medical countermeasures produced
by governments, think tanks, and newspapers; as well as of
scholarly articles and books published on health security.
Analysis of the source material suggests that recent government
efforts to stimulate the commercial development of new medical
countermeasures principally rely upon the state’s unique power to
introduce exceptional measures in the name of protecting national
security. At least ﬁve extraordinary government interventions can
be identiﬁed: (1) allocating earmarked public funds, (2) granting
comprehensive legal protections to pharmaceutical companies
against injury compensation claims, (3) introducing bespoke
pathways for regulatory approval, (4) instantiating emergency use
procedures, and (5) designing innovative logistical distribution
systems for mass drug administration beyond clinical settings.
Those combined measures are spawning a new, government-led
and quite exceptional medical countermeasure regime operating
outside of the conventional boundaries of pharmaceutical devel-
opment and regulation. In the ﬁrst comprehensive analysis of the
pharmaceuticalization dynamics at play in contemporary security
policy, this article unearths the array of policy interventions
through which governments are becoming more deeply imbricated
in the pharmaceuticalization of society.
2. Health security: the microbial turn in security policy
The ‘biological’ e even ‘microbial’ e turn in security policy is
increasingly well documented (Cooper, 2008; Elbe, 2003, 2009,2010b; Lakoff and Collier, 2008; McInnes and Lee, 2006;
Enemark, 2009; Rushton and Youde, 2014). Scholars in Interna-
tional Relations have advanced detailed explorations of how a
number of pressing international health issues have become
‘securitized’ (Elbe, 2006, 2010a; Davies, 2008; McInnes and
Rushton, 2013). Scholars of public health, conversely, have docu-
mented how that ﬁeld is simultaneously becoming more security
oriented e reminding readers of the historical legacies of linking
public health and security in the context of colonialism (King, 2002,
2003; Brown, 2011; Brown and Bell, 2008; Wright, 2006). Irre-
spective of whether one starts from the perspective of security or
public health, it is evident that theworlds of security and health are
beginning to converge ever more closely e conceptually, institu-
tionally, and programmatically.
Two distinct but related infectious disease threats animate this
convergence. The ﬁrst threat e bioterrorism e surfaced in security
debates during the 1990s. The subsequent terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001 in the United States, and the mailing of letters
laced with Anthrax through the U.S. postal system, would prove
decisive in elevating political perceptions about bioterrorism. As
David Franz, the former Commander of the U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), put it in
2002:
The thought of an outbreak of disease caused by the intentional
release of a pathogen or toxin in an American city was alien just
10 years ago. Many people believed that biological warfare was
only in the military’s imagination, perhaps to be faced by sol-
diers on a far-away battleﬁeld, if at all. The “anthrax letters” and
the resulting deaths from inhalation anthrax have changed that
perception. The national, state, and local governments in the
United States are preparing for what is now called “not if, but
when and how extensive” biological terrorism (Franz and
Zajtchuk, 2002).
The threat of a deliberate release of a disease-causing agent thus
marks one key driver for increased national security concerns about
acute infectious diseases.
Slightly different drivers are at play in the case of naturally
occurring infectious diseases e like pandemic inﬂuenza (Dry and
Leach, 2010; Dingwall et al., 2013; Figuié, 2013). Many public
health experts observe that three such ﬂu pandemics occurred in
the twentieth-century alone (Kilbourne, 2006). First came the
pandemic of 1918, undoubtedly the worst of the twentieth-century
when measured by scale of absolute human mortality. It struck at
the end of the First World War, and therefore prior to the wide-
spread availability of antibiotics and respirators e contributing to a
severe mortality rate estimated to run into the tens of millions
(Johnson and Mueller, 2002). Two further pandemics (in 1957 and
1968) followed in the second half of the twentieth century, albeit
with considerably smaller death tolls. The cyclical periodicity of
these events has nonetheless generated a perception amongst
public health experts that future pandemics are inevitable. As
Angus Nicoll, head of the inﬂuenza programme at the European
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) puts it: ‘European
policy-makers and politicians are put in a hard place by the pros-
pect of modern inﬂuenza pandemics. They don’t knowwhen one is
going to happen, where it will start or what it will be like. The only
certainty is that future inﬂuenza pandemicswill occur and theywill
be unpredictable’ (Nicoll and Sprenger, 2011).
Both of those ‘twin’ infectious disease threats have been subject
to diverging expert assessments regarding their likelihood and
severity. Charles Allen, the Chief Intelligence Ofﬁcer of the
Department of Homeland Security, for example, testiﬁed before
Congress that ‘in general, terrorist capabilities in the area of
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not see any indication of a rapid evolution of capability’ (cited in
Klotz, 2008: 109). Following the comparatively ‘mild’ pandemic of
2009, moreover, there has also been extensive public debate about
the assumptions underpinning recent pandemic preparedness
planning. Those uncertainties notwithstanding, the dual threats of
bioterrorism and pandemics have already proved sufﬁciently
potent politically over the past decade to prompt a progressive
widening of security agendas.
Especially in the United States and Europe, national security
policy now routinely includes the strengthening of ‘health security’.
In January 2000, for example, the US National Intelligence Council
declassiﬁed an inﬂuential National Intelligence Estimate entitled
The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United
States. The ﬁndings of the report showed that since 1973 at least 30
previously unknown disease agents have been identiﬁed (including
some for which there is no cure such as HIV, Ebola, Hepatitis C, and
Nipah virus). According to the report, ‘new and reemerging infec-
tious diseases will pose a rising global health threat and will
complicate US and global security over the next 20 years’ (NIC,
2000). The report marked a crucial turning point for introducing
health issues onto the security agenda of the United States.
Soon other countries also became more concerned about
health-based threats. Following the Anthrax letters of 2001, the
health ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and Mexico met in Ottawa on 7
November 2001 to convene the ﬁrst meeting of the new Global
Health Security Initiative (GHSI). Devoted initially to countering the
threat of bioterrorism, GHSI rapidly evolved to manage pandemic
threats as well. That same year, the European Union created a new
and high-level (albeit informal) Health Security Committee (HSC)
in order to strengthen health security in the European Union
(Kittelsen, 2013). Those on-going initiatives represent some of the
most prominent institutionalizations of the idea of health security
to date, which WHO has since deﬁned as ‘the activities required,
both proactive and reactive, to minimize vulnerability to acute
public health events that endanger the collective health of pop-
ulations living across geographical regions and international
boundaries’ (WHO, 2007: ix).
Over time, such emerging concerns about health security also
began to penetrate the formal national security strategies of several
governments (Elbe, 2009, 2010; Weir and Mykhalovskiy, 2010). In
the United States, for example, the National Security Strategy of
2002 stated that the government ‘will also continue to lead the
world in efforts to reduce the terrible toll of HIV/AIDS and other
infectious diseases’ (White House, 2002). The 2006 US National
Security Strategy again directly acknowledged the threat posed by
‘public health challenges like pandemics (HIV/AIDS, avian inﬂu-
enza) that recognize no borders’ (NSS, 2006). When the United
Kingdom developed its ﬁrst formal national security strategy in
2008, pandemic threats were explicitly incorporated e both
because of their ability to directly affect the country, and because
they could potentially undermine international stability more
generally (Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2008: 3). Pandemic threats also continue
to reside at the top of the UK national risk register and are identiﬁed
as a (top) Tier 1 threat in the 2010 National Security Strategy
(Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2010: 27). Most recently, pandemic threats were
similarly ﬂagged up in France’s 2013Whitepaper setting out French
national security policy for the period 2014e2019 (Livre Blanc,
2013; Kittelsen, 2013: 7). As we will see below, that expansion of
national security agendas to formally include health-based threats
has intensiﬁed government interest in acquiring pharmaceutical
defences for their populations, and has allowed pharmaceutical
logics to play a much more wide-ranging role in contemporary
security policy.3. Medical countermeasures: the rise of exceptional
pharmaceuticals
When it comes to protecting their populations against health
security threats, governments are turning towards pharmaceuticals
as their preferred ‘weapon’ of choice. Nothing reﬂects this phar-
maceutical turn in security policy more poignantly than the new
category of ‘medical countermeasures’, which has been forged by
governments to designate precisely those key pharmaceuticals that
could also contribute to protecting national security. Examples of
such medical countermeasures include antivirals, next-generation
vaccines, antibiotics and anti-toxins (Hoyt, 2014; Elbe, 2014).
Following a high-level workshop, the inﬂuential Institute of Med-
icine (IOM) in the United States deﬁned medical countermeasures
as ‘a drug, biological product, or device that treats, identiﬁes, or
prevents harm from a biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear
agent that may cause a public health emergency’ (IOM, 2010: 5).
That deﬁnition complements the U.S. government’s aspiration
to make pharmaceutical defences more widely available to the
civilian population through the Public Health Emergency Medical
Countermeasure Enterprise (PHEMCE). Citing the need to defend
American citizens (rather then just the armed forces) against health
security threats, PHEMCE takes the lead in ‘protecting the civilian
population from potential adverse health impacts through the use
of medical countermeasures, which aremedicines, devices, or other
medical interventions that can lessen the harmful effects of these
threats’ (PHE, 2012). In a single concept, the notion of medical
countermeasures thus captures how security policy is gravitating
more closely towards pharmaceutical solutions, how health and
security concerns increasingly interpenetrate each other, and how
security planners are broadening out those pharmaceutical pro-
tections to cover entire populations. The very constitution of this
new category of ‘medical countermeasures’ thus betrays the extent
to which pharmaceuticals with the potential to strengthening
health security have recently become a source of intensiﬁed po-
litical interest.
That pharmaceutical turn in security policy is evidenced further
by the many sizeable pharmaceutical stockpiles governments have
newly built in recent years. In 1999, and against the background of
growing concerns about bioterrorism and large-scale natural di-
sasters, the US Congress tasked the federal government with
creating a new National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS). In the
event of an emergency, the NPS would supply states and commu-
nities with large quantities of essential medical material within
12 h of a government decision (Prior, 2004). Initially supported
with an allocation of US$ 51 million, the new stockpile was
renamed the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) in 2003, as it
evolved into a much wider ‘national repository of antibiotics,
chemical antidotes, antitoxins, life-support medications, IV
administration and airway maintenance supplies, and medical/
surgical items’ (IOM, 2010: 6). By 2006, the push packages con-
tained in the SNS occupied 124 cargo containers, weighed 94,424
pounds and required 5000 square fee of ﬂoor space (Prior, 2004: 7).
Two years later, by 2008, the entire inventory of the stockpile was
valued at US$ 3.5 billion (Piester, 2008). This new pharmaceutical
stockpile, the precise location and detailed composition of which
remains classiﬁed, was ﬁrst deployed following the terrorist attacks
on 11 September 2001 in the United States (Prior, 2004: 2).
Although the United States government remains at the forefront
of pharmaceutical stockpiling for national security purposes, the
practice has also been adopted much more widely around the
world e especially amongst other high-income countries with the
requisite resources to do so. Prominent examples include the
Australian government, which created a National Medical Stockpile
(NMS) with a strategic reserve of essential vaccines, antibiotics and
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sonal protective equipment. The Canadian government similarly
maintains a National Emergency Stockpile System (NESS). The
United Kingdom too has established a Reserve National Stock for
Major Incidents that includes nerve agent antidotes, antitoxins,
antibiotics and other post-exposure medications e albeit on a
smaller scale than the United States (MOD, 2010).
Within the context of pandemic preparedness planning, more-
over, the UK government also created one of the world’s largest
stockpiles of antiviral medications. Amidst fears of an imminent
H5N1 human ﬂu pandemic in 2005, the UK government identiﬁed
the antiviral medication oseltamivir (brand name: Tamiﬂu) as the
‘ﬁrst line of defence’, and expended considerable public resources
to create a stockpile of the drug sufﬁciently to cover half of the UK
population. Subsequently the UK government increased the size of
its antiviral stockpile further to cover eighty per cent of its popu-
lation e effectively creating one of the world’s largest antiviral
stockpiles when measured by percentage of the population
covered.
Many other governments around the world built similar anti-
viral stockpiles. A review of European pandemic plans focussing on
2005 found that by that time 20 European countries had already
developed an antiviral-drug strategye a trend that would continue
to intensify (Mounier-Jack and Coker, 2006: 1408). By 2007, coun-
tries like France, Austria, Ireland, Luxemburg, and Switzerland had
set antiviral stockpiling targets in excess of thirty percent of the
civilian population, whilst countries like the Netherlands, Belgium,
Hong Kong, the United States, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, Malta,
Spain, Portugal, Finland and Sweden set them in excess of twenty
percent (Trakatellis, 2007: 23; see also Mounier-Jack et al., 2007).
Pharmaceutical stockpiling of medical countermeasures for civilian
use has thus become a much more widespread government prac-
tice, and is certainly not one conﬁned to the United States alone.
In fact, that trend towards large-scale antiviral stockpiling
continued apace so that by 2009 a total of 95 governments around
the world had reportedly purchased or ordered Tamiﬂu stockpiles.
All in all, the manufacturer Roche has announced, around 350
million treatment courses [3.5 billion doses] were supplied to
governments worldwide between 2004 and 2009 (Reddy, 2010:
ii35). The political decisions to create those numerous new phar-
maceutical stockpiles show that governments now widely believe
the security of their populations to require more than just the
traditional investments in armed force and the military, nuclear
deterrence and so forth. What is arguably a government’s highest
political priority e ensuring national security e also demands a
state capability to develop, acquire and rapidly orchestrate
population-wide interventions with key medical countermeasures.
Pharmaceuticals are becoming pivotal to national security.
4. An extraordinary medical countermeasure regime
So strong is the government interest in pharmaceutical re-
sponses that ofﬁcials are also trying to actively encourage the
development of many new medical countermeasures. Proactive
measures are deemed necessary because most research-based
pharmaceutical companies e especially the sizeable, multina-
tional ones e do not view medical countermeasures as a
commercially attractive area. From a business point of view, the
ﬁeld is characterized by an uncertain regulatory environment, and a
comparatively small market which usually only has one potential
buyer e the government. By and large, pharmaceutical companies
have thus determined medical countermeasures to be a high-risk,
low-reward market, and have preferred directing their research
capacities towards commercially more rewarding diseases. If gov-
ernments want to see the rapid development of new medicalcountermeasures to strengthen national security, they will have to
create stronger incentives to stimulate a market response from
commercial developers.
To overcome that challenge, governments have begun to spawn
a whole new pharmaceutical regime aimed at enhancing the in-
centives for commercial medical countermeasure development.
Drawing upon (but also adapting) the inﬂuential deﬁnition of re-
gimes prevalent in International Relations (see Krasner, 1983), that
medical countermeasure regime can be deﬁned as the assemblage
of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, institutions, and
decision-making procedures converging around the development,
approval, and use of pharmaceuticals in the area of health security.
Governments have been able to create this new medical counter-
measure regime by marshaling the state’s power to introduce
exceptional measures for the protection national security. Given
the centrality of security to the maintenance of social, political and
economic order, governments have the power to do things in the
name of security that would otherwise be politically impossible. As
the controversial legal theorist Carl Schmitt famously argued in
Political Theology, ‘sovereign is he who decides the exception’.
Schmitt had thought that any legal order ultimately rests upon a
political sovereign who has to take the decision when to suspend
the normal legal system so as to secure the order as a whole. Under
exceptional circumstances, it would be necessary to suspend the
normal juridical order in the name of protecting security (e.g.
declare a state of emergency).
Precisely this political power to determine the ‘exception’ also
lies at the heart of the new pharmaceutical regime that govern-
ments have spawned for incentivizing new medical countermea-
sure development. With the rise of health-based threats like
bioterrorism and pandemics, governments have effectively deter-
mined that some pharmaceuticals are ‘exceptional’ because they
can contribute to the protection of national security, and have
given them a special designation as ‘medical countermeasures’.
Once those medical countermeasures were conceptually differ-
entiated from more routine pharmaceuticals, it then became
possible for governments to adapt and suspend some of the
normal processes surrounding pharmaceutical development, and
e in the name of security e to introduce a new set of bespoke
rules speciﬁcally governing the development of novel medical
countermeasures.
As we will see in more detail below, at least ﬁve such
extraordinary policy interventions can be identiﬁed. First, gov-
ernments have intervened in the play of ‘normal’ market forces by
creating an artiﬁcial and government-backed market in medical
countermeasures underpinned by signiﬁcant public funds. Second,
governments exempted manufacturers of medical countermea-
sures from the usual legal compensation claims that might
otherwise arise under tort law. Third, governments introduced
bespoke pathways for the regulatory approval of medical coun-
termeasures, enabling the use of animal studies. Fourth, govern-
ments introduced emergency use procedures that e in exceptional
circumstances e would even allow for the use of unapproved
medical countermeasures. Finally, governments also designed
innovative logistical distribution systems for mass drug adminis-
tration outside of routine clinical settings. In the name of national
security, governments have engendered a new, government-led
and quite exceptional medical countermeasure regime operating
beyond the conventional boundaries of pharmaceutical develop-
ment and regulation.
4.1. Project BioShield: public funds for medical countermeasures
In order to lure companies into the area of countermeasures,
governments started by intervening in the normal play of free
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ernments committed funds from the public purse to effectively
constitute a new and government-backed market in medical
countermeasures. Undoubtedly the most prominent example of
such a government attempt to ﬁnancially stimulate the commercial
development of novel medical countermeasures is the Bioshield
program launched in the United States in 2004. The legislation
aimed to accelerate the research, development, purchase, and
availability of new medical countermeasures by establishing a
secure source of public funding worth US$ 5.6 billion so that newly
developed medical countermeasures could be bulk purchased by
the US government (IOM, 2010: 6). Here, governments have sought
to ‘artiﬁcially’ accelerate the development of new pharmaceutical
products through creating additional ﬁnancial incentives under-
pinned by public funds. That idea has subsequently also been
popularised in other areas of international health policy, as seen in
the use of advance market commitments to also stimulate the
development of vaccines for rare and neglected diseases (Berndt
et al., 2007).
Notwithstanding this substantial investment of public funds, it
quickly became clear that ﬁnancial incentives alone would be
insufﬁcient for luring a large number of commercially operating
companies into the medical countermeasure market. In response to
low commercial uptake, the US federal government decided in
2006 to go one step further by committing additional funds to
establish a whole new organization dedicated to working more
closely with commercial developers of new medical countermea-
sures e the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Au-
thority (BARDA). BARDA’s explicit mission is to develop and
procure needed medical countermeasures e including vaccines,
therapeutics, diagnostics, and also non-pharmaceutical counter-
measures e against a broad array of public health threats, whether
natural or intentional in origin. The organization’s primary strategic
goals thus consist of creating an ‘advanced development pipeline
replete with medical countermeasures and platforms to address
unmet public health needs, emphasizing innovation, ﬂexibility,
multi-purpose and broad spectrum application, and long-term
sustainability’ (BARDA, 2011).
Since its inception BARDA has rapidly emerged as one of the
world’s most advanced medical countermeasure enterprises.
BARDA has already initiated and/or completed acquisition contracts
for medical countermeasures worth more than US$ 2 billion e on
anthrax antitoxins and vaccines, botulism therapeutics, smallpox
vaccine, and radiological, nuclear and chemical threats (HHS, 2012).
Overall, those contracts have culminated in the federal acquisition
of tens of millions of doses of medical countermeasures (HHS,
2012). Under Project BioShield, the US government has so far
been able to add eleven new products to the nation’s emergency
stockpile; and e according to the Assistant Secretary for Pre-
paredness and Response Nicole Lurie e there are another eighty
pharmaceuticals in various stages of development for treating
victims of a biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological incident
(Schneidmiller, 2013). That comes against a background of a wider
US government investment of more than US$ 60 billion in civilian
biodefense made available over the past decade, and in addition to
any classiﬁed research conducted in the security and defence
agencies (Franco and Sell, 2011: 119).
In Europe such initiatives to develop new medical counter-
measures are still largely conducted at the level of national gov-
ernments e with considerable disparities in terms of the political
will and capabilities of countries to undertake such programmes. In
the United Kingdom, for example, the Defence Science & Technol-
ogy Laboratory (DSTL) e located within the Ministry of Defense e
similarly initiated a medical countermeasures programme to
develop a range of new pharmaceutical products for protecting theUK population. What is more, when it comes to the mass pro-
curement (rather than the development) of medical countermea-
sures for stockpiling purposes, greater degrees of co-operation are
also beginning to emerge at the European level. A recent agreement
reached on health security in the European Union, for example,
established the legal basis for the voluntary joint procurement of
medical countermeasures, especially of vaccines (EU, 2013). In the
name of security, and in drawing upon their powers of taxation,
some governments have taken the extraordinary step of inter-
vening in the play of ‘normal’ market forces by making signiﬁcant
amounts of public funding available for incentivizing the com-
mercial development and procurement of new medical
countermeasures.
4.2. The PREP Act: new legal protections for pharmaceutical
companies
Although the provision of earmarked public funding is one key
pillar of the government-led medical countermeasure regime, it is
far from the only one. Governments have further incentivized the
commercial development of new medical countermeasure by
granting their manufacturers special and wide-ranging protections
against lawsuits. These quite extraordinary protections are against
legal compensation claims that could be reasonably anticipated to
surface in the context of the mass administration of a new medical
countermeasure e especially if unexpected side effects emerge. In
the United States, a precedent for such protections was introduced
through the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA) of 1986,
which focused on ﬁnancial liabilities of vaccinemanufacturers from
injury claims. In 2005, and in the name of strengthening national
security, such protections were extended to medical countermea-
sures more generally through the Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness Act (PREP Act).
The PREP Act provides the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services with the power to issue a declaration
providing immunity from tort liability e the area of law where a
person who suffers an injury might sue to receive compensation
from those responsible for causing the damage or injury. The
provisions are principally intended to cover claims related to the
administration of medical countermeasures during an emer-
gency. The mechanism protects a wide range of ‘entities and
individuals involved in the development, manufacture, testing,
distribution, administration, and use of such countermeasures
(IOM, 2010: 6). The extensive types of loss covered by the PREP
Act span: death; physical, mental, or emotional injury, illness,
disability, or condition; and loss or damage to property (IOM,
2010: 22). That protection from tort liability is not completely
unlimited, however, in that the act does not provide protections
for death or serious injury arising from willful misconduct (IOM,
2010: 22).
This new mechanism has already been invoked on several oc-
casions e in relation to acute radiation syndrome, to anthrax
botulism, to pandemic inﬂuenza, to 2009 H1N1 inﬂuenza, and to
smallpox. The medical countermeasures covered by these decla-
rations to date include vaccines, antivirals (both Tamiﬂu and
Relenza), and also respiratory devices (IOM, 2010: 24). Taking the
extraordinary step of shielding commercial manufacturers from the
ﬁnancial risks associated with potential legal liabilities arising from
the widespread use of medical countermeasures thus forms a
second key mechanism through which governments are deploying
the extraordinary powers of the state to incentivize the commercial
development of new medical countermeasures. Governments are
deploying not just their control of the public purse, but also their
powers to suspend elements of the law in the name of protecting
national security.
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approval
The design of bespoke new pathways for the regulatory
approval of medical countermeasures marks yet another extraor-
dinary policy mechanism introduced by governments. A signiﬁcant
hurdle in developing newmedical countermeasures is that it can be
much more difﬁcult to conduct the human clinical trials necessary
for securing regulatory approval. Many of the diseases that could
potentially be used for bioterrorism are not naturally occurring, or
occur only in such small numbers that it is not feasible to run large
clinical trials. There would also be strong ethical concerns about
deliberately infecting humans with such agents in order to evaluate
the effectiveness of new medicines. Commercial developers of
medical countermeasures thus face the difﬁcult question of how to
obtain regulatory approval for their new products. Evenwhere they
may be able to do so, the mere existence of this additional regu-
latory complication generates increased commercial risk as to
whether any product they are able to develop would ever secure
the regulatory approval required for bringing it to market.
To diminish this regulatory ‘disincentive’, the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) introduced a new ‘animal rule’ procedure in
May 2002, which underwent a process of further review and public
consultation in 2009 and 2010. The new rule deviates from the
usual processes of regulatory approval by allowing sponsors to gain
regulatory approval for their new medical countermeasures on the
basis of animal studies, which model the disease in human beings.
The rule stipulates that animal studies can be used to establish the
effectiveness for products where the mechanisms of toxicity of the
product is well understood, where the effect is established in more
than one species of animal expected to be predictive for humans (in
some cases one well characterized animal model could be sufﬁ-
cient), and the workings of the drug are sufﬁciently well under-
stood to allow for the selection of an effective dose in humans (FDA,
2002).
This new animal rule pathway too has been used on several
occasions already. Initially, it was mostly invoked to approve new
indications for existing products. When, for example, the new
procedure was ﬁrst triggered on 5 February 2003, FDA approved
the application of pyridostigmine bromide (PB) for prophylaxis
against the lethal effects of Soman nerve agent poisoning. PB had
been approved in the United States as early as 1955 e albeit for the
treatment of a rare neurological disorder called myasthenia gravis
(Aebersold, 2012). The second occasion on which the new animal
rule was invoked related to Cyanokit e an antidote for treating
patients with known or suspected cyanide poisoning. Cyanokit had
already been granted marketing authorization by the French au-
thorities in May 1996, on the basis one prospective study and
several retrospective studies in victims of smoke inhalation
(Aebersold, 2012). Following additional animal studies, the FDA
gave approval to Cyanokit in December 2006 under the new animal
rule, based primarily on a single placebo-controlled study in dogs
(Aebersold, 2012).
More recently, the animal rule has also been utilized to approve
newly developed medical countermeasures. In April 2012, for
example, FDA invoked the animal rule to approve Levaquin (levo-
ﬂoxacin) e an antibiotic manufactured by Johnson & Johnson
intended to treat pneumonic plague. The approval was granted on
the basis of tests carried out on African green monkeys (Gaffney,
2012). In December of that same year, FDA also granted approval
to GlaxoSmithKline’s raxibacumab e a monoclonal antibody
intended to treat inhalational anthrax. In this case, one study was
performed on monkeys, and three more on rabbits. At the time of
writing, the biopharmaceutical company Chimerix was also
developing a new smallpox antiviral (CMX001) under the animalrule, as smallpox has been declared eradicated in human beings
(Chimerix, 2013).
In Europe, moreover, the European Medicines Agency has
initiated three different procedures for speeding up the availability
of inﬂuenza vaccines during a pandemic. These include: 1) a ’mock-
up procedure’ whereby a vaccine can be authorized in advance of a
pandemic on the basis of a strain that could potentially cause a
pandemic; 2) an ’emergency procedure’ which reduces the autho-
rization procedure from 210 to 70 days; and 3) a ‘modiﬁcation’
procedure whereby a ‘seasonal’ ﬂu vaccine might be altered to
afford protection against a pandemic strain (EMA, 2014). The
introduction of such bespoke and special pathways for regulatory
approval thus marks a third mechanism through which several
governments are actively incentivizing the commercial develop-
ment of newmedical countermeasures through the introduction of
extraordinary measures e in this case by drawing upon the state’s
power of regulation.
4.4. Emergency use authorization: new pathways for using
unapproved drugs
Some governments have also introduced new procedures stip-
ulating the (emergency) conditions under which it could even be
permissible to use unapproved medicines, or use medicines for
purposes and indications other than those for which they were
initially approved. The United States government, for example,
introduced a new Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) procedure in
2004 as part of the Project BioShield Act. An EUA ‘is an authoriza-
tion issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for the use
of an unapproved medical product or an unapproved use of an
approvedmedical product during a declared emergency involving a
heightened risk of attack on the public or U.S. military forces, or a
signiﬁcant potential to affect national security’ (IOM, 2010: 5).
The new policy mechanism enables the government to deploy
medical countermeasures in an emergency e even if the product is
not yet approved by the FDA, or has not been approved for that
particular use. The determination of such an emergency can be
made either by health or security authorities e speciﬁcally the
Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of
Homeland Security, or the Department of Defence; and the
declared emergency can be a military, domestic, or public health
emergency, but should be one that affects, or has a signiﬁcant po-
tential to affect, national security. The agents covered by the pro-
cedure can include a broad spectrum of chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear agents (IOM, 2010: 27).
This new procedure has already proved useful to U.S. govern-
ment ofﬁcials on several occasions. It was ﬁrst invoked for a
medication designed to address the threat of inhalational anthrax.
Subsequently the procedure has been triggered to cover antibiotic
emergency kits (in 2008), and for several products during the
inﬂuenza A(H1N1) pandemic of 2009 (IOM, 2010: 25). According to
Susan Sherman, from the Ofﬁce of General Counsel of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, the new procedure can greatly
ease the use of pharmaceuticals during an emergency:
From a legal perspective, there are a lot of situations where [an]
EUA helps get past all those requirements. You can change the
labeling. You can change the information. You can change the
dosage. You can give it to populations for which [it] wasn’t
approved (IOM, 2010: 26).
Crucially, the role of the FDA is not completely sidestepped
during the procedure; it is still up to the FDA to review the EUA
request, which can be issued by the FDA Commissioner via a formal
letter of authorization. The FDAwill look at factors such as whether
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whether it is reasonable to believe that the product would be
effective for its intended use, whether the known and potential
beneﬁts outweigh the risks, andwhether there is no other adequate
and approved medical countermeasure available (IOM, 2010:29).
Other governments are looking into introducing similar pro-
cesses. In Europe, for example, the European Commission has spent
much of the past decade developing its own health security
framework e focussing on prevention, preparedness, and re-
sponses to threats (EC, 2009; European Commission, 2012). A new
agreement on strengthening EU health security reached in 2013
also:
provides for the possibility that the Commission recognizes a
situation of public health emergency for the purposes of con-
ditional marketing authorizations for medicinal products and
for derogations of the terms of a marketing authorization for a
human inﬂuenza vaccine. This would allow accelerated mar-
keting of medicinal products or vaccines in an emergency situ-
ation (EU, 2013).
Such procedures would enable e again under exceptional
emergency conditions only e medical countermeasures to be
deployed even without marketing approval or, in the case of
Europe, via expedited approval procedures. Deploying the state’s
exceptional power to temporarily suspend existing regulatory
frameworks during an emergency thus marks another pivotal axis
in the extraordinary medical countermeasures regime that gov-
ernments have been creating.4.5. Mass drug administration systems: the National Pandemic Flu
Service
Governments have even developed elaborate new systems of
the mass administration of medical countermeasures outside of the
more established clinical settings like hospitals, doctor’s surgeries,
and pharmacies. Developing such new systems has been necessary
to cope with the logistical challenges of rapidly distributing large
quantities of medical countermeasures to the population in the
event of an emergency. Perhaps the most prominent recent
example of this process was the launch of the National Pandemic
Flu Service (NPFS) in the United Kingdom during the 2009 inﬂu-
enza A(H1N1) pandemic. Faced with an unexpected surge in hu-
man H1N1 infections, which was by this time also beginning to
place a heavy burden on the National Health Service (NHS), the UK
authorities decided to set up a new telephone and internet-based
National Pandemic Flu Service that could distribute the antiviral
medication directly tomembers of the population. NPFS was, in the
words of one report, the ‘ﬁrst mass application of non-clinical based
triage’ (Baker, 2010: 7).
In most cases, concerned citizens were able to obtain Tamiﬂu
prescriptions simply by going through a quick and fairly simple
online self-assessment questionnaire. Obtaining Tamiﬂu became as
easy as picking up the phone or going online, connecting to the new
UK Pandemic Flu website, ticking a few boxes related to a set of
common ﬂu symptoms and, where the symptoms criteria were
met, note down a unique reference number to obtain Tamiﬂu from
the nearest ofﬁcial collection point e preferably through the use of
what British authorities affectionately referred to as ‘ﬂu buddies’.
Not surprisingly, the systemwas easily open to abuse by those who
wanted to create personal stockpiles of the drug. As onemanager of
a generalmedical practice notedwith exasperation during the 2009
inﬂuenza A (H1N1) outbreak, ‘at present, it [Tamiﬂu] might as well
be given out on street corners’ (Peek, 2009). Overall the servicereportedly performed 2,732,000 assessments, of which 1,800,000
resulted in antiviral authorization (Baker, 2010: 7).
Although the British system was one of the most wide-ranging
and ambitious in the world, all countries which had invested in
stockpiling the drug needed to develop plans for rolling out large
number of treatment courses to the population in a short period of
time. Different models of mass drug delivery include the use of
national postal systems, relying on commercial logistics companies,
or asking the military to accomplish this task. Irrespective of which
model was ultimately adopted, the investment in such newmodels
for mass pharmaceutical delivery formed an additional way for
governments to signal their political commitment to this area of
medical countermeasures and health security. Those new logistical
systems for distributing medical countermeasures outside of the
normal clinical settings thus mark a ﬁnal pillar of the new excep-
tional new pharmaceutical regime that governments have recently
spawned for the development of new medical countermeasures.
5. Conclusion
What does this new, government-led and quite exceptional
medical countermeasure regime imply for our understanding of the
contemporary dynamics of pharmaceuticalization? Existing ac-
counts of pharmaceuticalization have mostly emphasized the
pivotal role of industry, and have therefore tended to accord gov-
ernments a comparatively modest role. Where scholars have
acknowledged the role of governments, they have tended to focus
on the changing approaches taken by state regulatory agencies in
approving novel pharmaceutical products (Permanand, 2006;
Carpenter, 2010; Davis and Abraham, 2012). The analysis of na-
tional security policy undertaken here, however, suggests that
governments are emerging as much more proactive drivers of
pharmaceuticalization than this received picture suggests e
necessitating an adjustment to our understanding of the underly-
ing drivers of pharmaceuticalization.
In the name of national security, several governments are now
actively incentivizing the commercial development of new phar-
maceuticals through a broad array of extraordinary policy levers.
New regulatory approval processes are certainly one such mecha-
nism; but in the case of medical countermeasures they are but one
of many. As we have seen, other extraordinary mechanisms intro-
duced by governments over the past decade include the provision
of earmarked public funds, the granting of extensive legal pro-
tections for pharmaceutical companies, the introduction of emer-
gency use procedures, and the development of innovative logistical
systems formass drug administration outside of established clinical
settings. Governments, in other words, are not just crucial drivers of
pharmaceuticalization; they are also highly complex because their
national security powers are potent, plentiful and e perhaps most
critically e substantially different from the powers available to
pharmaceutical companies and other actors.
This government-led medical countermeasure regime spawned
in the name of national security is already accelerating, intensifying
and opening up new trajectories of pharmaceuticalization in soci-
ety. The regime has, for example, already enabled e through new
public investment and legal protections e many novel pharma-
ceutical products to be developed that would otherwise not have
been. Already this new medical countermeasure regime has e
through the ‘animal rule’ and the emergency use authorization e
facilitated the use of pharmaceuticals inways that would otherwise
not have been possible. And already this new pharmaceutical
regime has opened up new routes for pharmaceutical consumption
through the development of new logistical systems for mass drug
administration outside of clinical settings e as witnessed during
the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Those are all ways in which
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pharmaceuticalization of society.
None of this is meant to imply that all those government efforts
have been complete successes, and have passed without contes-
tation. In fact, the experience of the past decade suggests that the
process of medical countermeasure development has been fraught
with unanticipated complexities, complications, and quite a high
failure rate (Hoyt, 2012). It has simply proved much more difﬁcult
to incentivize the commercial development of new medical coun-
termeasures than had initially been expected. For that reason the
pharmaceuticalization dynamics in this sector also continue to
evolve. In 2010, for example, the Department of Health and Human
Services undertook a comprehensive review of the entire medical
countermeasure enterprise in the United States. The review iden-
tiﬁed several adjustments that would be needed e including a
Concept Acceleration Program at the National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) e to speed up the identiﬁcation of
promising newmedical countermeasures. It further envisioned the
creation of a new ‘Strategic Investor’ ofﬁce that could provide
companies working in this area with detailed business advice. It
also sought to invest in new surge manufacturing capacity for
medical countermeasures, as well as a new Medical Countermea-
sure Initiative (MCMi) that would address outstanding regulatory
issues around medical countermeasures at FDA. The political push
for new medical countermeasures, in short, is proving to be an
evolving quest. The one thing that is already becoming quite clear,
however, is that in the twenty-ﬁrst century our futures will not only
be secured militarily e but also pharmaceutically.
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